Analyzing an Experiment Gone Awry: A Unique Application of Bacon\u27s Corrective Model to the First Amendment Protection of Essential Rights and Liberties by Williams, Nancy S.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 4 Beyond Tobacco Symposium: Tort Issues in
Light of the Cigarette Litigation
Article 12
5-15-2000
Analyzing an Experiment Gone Awry: A Unique
Application of Bacon's Corrective Model to the
First Amendment Protection of Essential Rights
and Liberties
Nancy S. Williams
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy S. Williams Analyzing an Experiment Gone Awry: A Unique Application of Bacon's Corrective Model to the First Amendment
Protection of Essential Rights and Liberties, 27 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 4 (2000)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/12
Analyzing an Experiment Gone Awry:
A Unique Application of Bacon's
Corrective Model to the First
Amendment Protection of
Essential Rights and Liberties
Promising both academic enrichment and challenging provocation, John Witte,
Jr.' accomplishes both purposes by carefully tracing the history of the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the Constitution and, through uncharted territory,
analyzing their historical and current application in terms of the effectiveness of
this American Experiment.2 Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment:
Essential Rights and Liberties3 examines the religious freedom clauses as the "fair"
and "novel experiment" which Thomas Jefferson and the framers contemplated in
the context of Francis Bacon's corrective paradigm for experimental methods gone
awry. In an inventive and refreshing survey, Witte ultimately calls for a new form
of a more integrated framework of religious liberty, born primarily of the
recognition that the nature of the First Amendment is grounded in "theological
visions and values." Refusing to strip the clauses of their necessarily personal and
moral implications, Witte recognizes a set of basic principles which must, woven
together, form an "interlocking and interdependent shield of religious liberties and
rights for all."
Latching on to the Bacon's three correctives to propose a remedy for the
experimental defects of the religion clauses, Witte provides a welcome roadmap to
guide both the constitutional novice and expert through the historical base of the
clauses, their implementation, and the perceived breakdown of that implementation.
Witte heeds Bacon's instructions for correcting defects:
First, said Bacon, we must "return to first principles and axioms," reassess them in
1. Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law and Ethics; Director, Law and Religion Program, Emory
University. Professor Witte, a Harvard Law School graduate, is author or editor of over 10 books and
over 60 articles and book chapter, with many forthcoming.
2. The clauses read: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. .
3. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000).
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light of our experience, and "if necessary refine them." Second, we must assess "our
experience with the experiment" in light of these first principles, to determine where
"the experiment should be adjusted." Third, we must "compare our experiments"
and experiences with those of fellow scientists, and where we see in that comparison
"superior techniques," we must "amend our experiments" and even our first
principles accordingly.
By analyzing the clauses under this model, the reader may more easily navigate the
waters that theological and political movements left murky on the eve of
constitutional drafting. Detailing six first principles that he perceives prominent
in these movements, Witte explains the failings of the applications of the clauses
today and proposes remedy to the extent that he contemplates it exists.
I. RETURNING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
Pursuant to Bacon's model, Religion promises to return to the first principles
upon which the framers articulated the clauses, reassess these principles in light of
our experience with their effectiveness, and refine them as needed. Witte
commences this process by outlining the major precedent for religious freedom as
envisioned by the American Experiment. His conclusion that these principles were
not in themselves unique but rather were implemented in a unique way through our
experiment helps the reader to appreciate both the value of the principles as
cornerstones in theological movements and the novelty of the American implemen-
tation of those principles in the constitutional experiment.
In a somewhat obvious but certainly appreciated gesture, Witte reminds the
reader that to limit the American experiment to the parameters of the First
Amendment provisions would sketch only the outer limits of our plight for
protecting religious liberties. Instead, he describes the influential "'canopy' of
opinions," comprised of the theological Puritanical and Evangelical views, as well
as the political thought of the Enlightenment thinkers and the Civil Republicans,
concluding that in the interplay of these principles lies the elusive "original
understanding" of the founders. He enumerates the "essential rights and liberties"
of religion: (1) liberty of conscience; (2) free exercise of religion; (3) religious
pluralism; (4) religious equality; (5) separation of church and state; and (6)
disestablishment of religion. However, by tying the four theological and political
views to the sacrosanct "essential rights and freedoms" he envisions underlying the
protective canopy, Witte unfortunately comers these ideals within the formulaic
parameters of these schools of thought.4 Surely the ideals that are the essential
rights and liberties are more grounded in who we are as a people, as he previously
4. Though Witte reasons that no one school of thought lies at the base of the founder's
understanding, but rather in the interplay between the theological Puritanical and Evangelical views and
the political views of the Enlightenment and Civil Republicans, the reader is a bit confounded as to why
these four principles should be considered prime while others are not addressed.
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asserted by claiming that the American constitutional experiment is, to large extent,
mere implementation of age-old morals and personal theology. Witte would be
well served by revisiting his assertions. The line he draws between the theological
and political views and the essential rights and liberties is an important one, but his
failure to remind the reader of the additional lines which we must draw to gain a
balanced picture undercuts his message that two phrases in our Constitution do not
fully contemplate the American experiment, its influence, and its power.
His forgetfulness in not reminding the reader to regard these essential rights
and liberties in light of the relevant history is certainly more accurately described
as oversight of not remembering his audience than as failure to accurately portray
the essence of the clauses. Witte characterizes the religious liberty envisioned by
the framers crafting the First Amendment under these principles as designed "to
provide an interwoven shield against repressive religious establishments" and to be
"mutually supportive and mutually subservient to the highest goal of guaranteeing
'the essential rights and liberties of religion' for all." Witte conveys beautifully the
necessary nature of the these principles to achievement of rights he heralds as
essential to both "individual flourishing and social cohesion." Furthermore, by
tracing the twenty drafts of the clauses, the reader is able to understand the
frustration the framers felt in trying to convey their intent and, in a parallel sense,
the frustration of today's judges, professors, attorneys, students, and all of society
in attaching a meaning to these clauses that does not compromise or undermine that
illusive intent. Having prepared us historically, the reader may then take Witte's
hint and understand that the reason for the present confusion may well be the
current concentration on the language of the clauses themselves, overshadowing
the guarantee of essential rights and freedoms at the heart of the framers' efforts
to draft a truly protective amendment which was careful to not enumerate so greatly
that what was omitted could be disregarded.
11. ASSESSING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
Under the Bacon model, Witte spends the next five chapters analyzing the
experiment under the second prong of the test, which requires an examination of
the experiment under the first principles out of which the experiment was created
to determine appropriate areas for adjusting the experiment. In light of the state
constitutions adopted in the period before 1947, most states were not concerned
that these rights might not be preserved. Largely, the availability of the frontier
instead made the plight of religious liberty more realistic, because each religious
group was able to separate itself geographically and socially from other religions.
Witte explains well the ramifications of the closing frontier. As space to form new
religious communities decreased, so did tolerance for other ideologies among any
specific religion. Those not conforming were denied rights they otherwise could
have enjoyed under the Framer's conception of essential rights and liberties. Such
injustice under the true meaning of essential rights and liberties led dissenters to
federal court to raise their claim of unconstitutional practice.
Witte assesses the Supreme Court rulings regarding the First Amendment
separately-those before the 1940s and those after, with the 1940 Cantwell v.
Connecticut5 and 1947 Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp.6 decisions as
the dividing line. He draws this helpful line between the cases, emphasizing the
heightened degree of First Amendment scrutiny to which the more modem line of
cases must rise, occurring after the incorporation of the First Amendment to the
states. Witte attacks the daunting task of tracing the history of these cases with a
grace which, though not simplifying their significance, presents the cases so that
the novice may understand and be intrigued by the current state of religious law and
the expert is compelled to ask again the questions-and likely with a new
perspective--which he can only hope to answer through a lifetime of study.7
Witte's suggestions as he navigates through the history of free exercise and
disestablishment law are well taken and his thorough analysis of the breakdown
which the interpretation of these clauses suffered, removing them from their
grounding in the essential rights and liberties, sobers the constitutionally vigilant
reader with the understanding of how far we have strayed as a nation from the
intent of these clauses.
Witte aids the reader greatly with his summary of First Amendment case law
from the early Supreme Court on polygamy, pacifism, and funding. Against this
backdrop, Cantwell and Everson assume greater significance for the shift they
imposed on constitutional law practice. With rare ease, authority, and clarity, Witte
maps the modem free exercise doctrine, differentiating between the case-by-case
and definitional balancing9 methods of resolving conflicts between government
power and free exercise rights."° Examining modem free exercise law, Witte
5. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Cantwell marked the first time that the Court applied the free exercise
clause to the states, invalidating the application of a statute which prohibited, among other things,
evangelizing. See id. at 301-03, 311.
6. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Everson Court held that a state statute allowing local school districts
to make laws, one of which provided bussing of children to both public and parochial schools, was
constitutional. Witte describes Everson as "an open invitation to litigation. See id. at 3-5, 18.
7. Witte reports that for the first 150 years, the Court decided 32 cases regarding religious liberty.
Additionally, over the last 60 years, more than 150 cases have been heard before the Court, most of
them regarding incorporation of the doctrine to the states and specifically addressing application of the
First Amendment to state and local governments.
8. This method produces clusters of cases with similar fact patters or other characteristics which
bind their reasoning and holding together.
9. This method involves application of different levels of scrutiny, as the Court has mandated,
from strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny to the rational basis standard of review.
10. Finding that these two are the primary techniques used by the Court in resolving the conflict,
Witte also recognizes alternative forms embraced by the Court when wandering from these techniques,
including its wanderings away from "the common logic of a factual cluster," its brief abandonment of
a general standard of review, and its formulation of categorical holdings.
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skillfully explains that the cases reflect both a constitutional battle extending
beyond the facts of the cases themselves and the application of the first principles
of religious liberty. With this background, the constitutional novice will be
genuinely disheartened when realizing that these concerns are modernly reduced
to a neutrality standard.
Witte next carefully analyzes the transition from the cases of the 1940s, which
provided what he characterizes as multi-layered protective shield of First
Amendment religious rights, to the modem trend since the 1980s, in which the
"single and simple principle of neutrality" reigns, replacing the previous emphasis
on what he refers to as the founding principles of First Amendment law.1 With
this understanding, Witte' s assertion that modem claimants must now seek remedy
for such conflict in the free speech clause of the First Amendment and in federal
and states statutes is better understood. Furthermore, though the reader is easily
convinced by Witte that these alternative protections are inferior and insufficient,
the significance of other available remedy is certainly appreciated as the reader
begins to contemplate the deficiencies of the current experiment.
Revisiting the Court's refusal in Employment Division v. Smith 2 to view the
clause under the Founders' understanding and incorporate the "essential rights and
freedoms" for which Witte has argued so convincingly, the reader becomes
indignant over the loss of this constitutional protection. By the end of his survey
of the Free Exercise cases, the reader listens in earnest to Witte's plea that these
alternative protections be pursued for the moment, while the fight continues to
remove the "sting" inflicted by Smith. Witte's application of the second phase of
Bacon's model to the Free Exercise cases thus draws to a close, but leaves the
reader a bit bewildered. Though making this final suggestion in his conclusion,
Witte leaves the reader wanting, with no real understanding of whether and how
the Court will alter the current experiment so that it yields accurate and appropriate
results. Though the immediate solution of pursuing alternative protections is
practical enough to encourage implementation, the reader waits in quiet anticipation
of a non-existent simple solution to the constitutional dilemma.
Moving on the disestablishment cases, Witte explains that challenges to the
establishment clause occur when the claimant encounters a law which establishes
religion. He argues that disestablishment law is moving in the opposite direction
from the law evolving under the free exercise clause, evidenced by the apparent
11. These principles include freedom and equality of religious dxpression, liberty of conscience,
separation of church and state, and religious pluralism.
12. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
lack of clear standard for adjudication. 3 Under a group of three traditional and
four modem approaches, Witte's explanation is refreshingly clear, though the
complex nature of solving such conflict is not lost on the reader, who is now wary
of oversimplification of these principles per Witte's admonition. Juxtaposing the
four modem approaches, the reader is appropriately frustrated by the muddied state
of the law. 4 Finally, Witte traces the reasoning of the Everson Court, which
erected the "wall of separation between church and state," in a way surely never
contemplated by Thomas Jefferson. This unfortunate misnomer stirs the reader,
who now recognizes the degree to which this qualification on the First Amendment
renders the essential rights and liberties, once inextricable from the Founders'
contemplation of disestablishment, void.
Focusing on the affect on public education, the role of the government in
religious education, and religion in the public square, even the constitutional law
student, familiar with the relevant case law, is relieved when Witte summarizes the
trend of strict separation between church and state in our recent past and the current
turn back, now providing at last the same protection and benefits to religious and
nonreligious groups. 5 Though Witte commends the Court for recognizing in
Everson the first principles as manifested in disestablishment law, the reader
remains disappointed, as is Witte, by the Court's grand failing to remain consis-
tently true to those principles in applying the First, by adopting a standard to ensure
constitutionality.
Witte educates the reader so his distrust for the Court's application of the
Establishment Clause is not unhealthy or cynical, but rather grounded in fact and
understanding. Witte calls the reader to a healthy fear for the future of our
constitutional rights and encourages us also to earnestly seek separation of church
and state only in pursuit of protecting these rights which are essential. Witte
convinces the reader that insisting on this separation as it pertains to essential rights
and liberties differs greatly from insisting the same with regard to unessential rights
and liberties. Reaching those "unessentials" with this analysis, Witte argues, will
both trivialize religion's place in public and private life and, more importantly,
"trivialize[] the power of the Constitution, converting it from a coda of cardinal
principles of national law into a codex of petty precepts of local life." Surely, it is
at this point that disestablishment would impede the free exercise of religion-in the
ultimate constitutional contradiction of purpose.
Witte analyzes the tax exemption of religious property in an effort to illustrate
13. Witte argues that the free exercise clause is currently experiencing a transition from a multi-
principled to a single-principled reading (peaking out at total neutrality) while the establishment clause
is undergoing the opposite transition, moving from a single-principled to a multi-principled reading.
14. The modem approaches include O'Connor's endorsement test, Kennedy's coercion test,
Souter's neutrality test, and an equal treatment analysis, which largely parallels neutrality.
15. Witte reminds us that the Establishment Clause was supposed to complement the Free Exercise
Clause under the Framers' view. The Establishment Clause outlawed prescription of religion while the
Free Exercise Clause outlawed the proscription of religion.
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the modem movement of the religious liberty doctrine, discussing the tension
between state and federal religious liberty law, the tension between the free
exercise and establishment clauses, and the difficulty of defining religion at law
and remaining consistent in interpreting that definition. He argues persuasively for
the constitutionality of tax exemption, advocating a "self-imposed ethic of
moderation and modesty," under which auxiliary properties, not required for the
ministry of a given religion, would not be subject to tax exemption, unless used for
charitable purposes. 6
III. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES
Under the third instruction in Bacon's model, the vigilant scientist must now
compare his experiment with the experiments and experiences of other scientists,
looking for superior techniques which call him to amend his own. Witte
undertakes this portion of assessment by comparing the American experiment to
relevant international religious rights and liberties norms. Though he concludes
that international human rights norms "are no panacea to the current constitutional
confusion," he skillfully excises those characteristics of this body of law that
enable it to more adequately protect religious rights and to advocate affirmative
state action. Applying lessons learned thereby, he calls for a unified approach to
adjudicating First Amendment religious freedom. Ultimately, he envisions a "more
integrated approach," which "incorporates the first principles of religious rights
and liberties on which the American experiment was founded and integrates them
into the resolution of specific cases."
Assessing three international instruments, Witte analyzes current American
law under the principles of these agreements.' 7 He suggests that we might learn
from the international application of laws which we embrace or neglect, concluding
that the norms "confirm and prioritize" the essential rights and liberties, at least to
some extent. Under these international instruments, Witte concludes that, like
America, the international community protects pluralism, promotes a strict scrutiny
16. Witte's argument is certainly intriguing. However, his analysis is problematic in that it
provokes more questions than it answers. Under Bacon's model, we should be discovering ways to
refine our experiment, but this inquiry simply illustrates the vast insufficiencies of the current
experiment, in so many areas of application that they appear too numerous to tackle.
17. Witte relies on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief (1981); and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of
Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(1989) in assessing international law norms.
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standard for free exercise claims, endorses a noncoercion standard for establish-
ment clause claims, advocates equal access and equal treatment, would uphold
indiscriminate treatment of religious and nonreligious groups, and would approve
of cases which protect religion generically. Conversely, Witte concludes that the
international norms conflict with the American cases punishing religious polygamy
practices, allowing discriminatory treatment of religious minorities, and permitting
governmental resolution of private religious affairs. Most importantly, Witte urges
the Court adopt, as the international community has, a definition of religion which
would establish boundaries of protection, thereby enabling the Court to extend the
protection the essential rights and liberties compels it to extend. The merits of this
argument are obvious: a definition would certainly ensure more accurate and
consistent application of First Amendment law, while enabling the Court to return
to the first principles upon which the experiment began.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through his detailed but absolutely comprehensible tracing of the history of
the essential rights and liberties and the Framers' manifestation of their understand-
ing of those rights in drafting the First Amendment, Witte thrusts the reader's mind
fully into the free exercise and establishment clauses, thereby inspiring us all to
question the theory under which current cases are decided and how the movement
of cases has swept the current law away from the ideals to which the framers
fought hard to cling. Those rights and liberties endorsed by both the Framers and
Witte are convincingly essential and the failure of our current law to hold to that
intent resounds within the reader's constitutional conscience as he recognizes,
through Witte's perceiving eyes and then through his own, how the American
constitutional experiment has gone awry and how to force it home, to fully embrace
those rights for which it was first enacted. Though the method in which we engage
in that embrace is uncertain, Witte's enthusiastic advocacy of constitutional reform
encourages and inspires the reader that realization of an experiment which provides
effective protection of our essential rights and liberties is on the horizon. Most
effectively, Witte causes the reader to reflect on our current First Amendment law
and contemplate a restoration to those ideals under which the Framers enacted the
free exercise and establishment clauses.
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